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If the numbers are not random, they are at least higgledy-piggledy.
- George Marsaglia (1984), quoted by D. E. Knuth on p. 179 of ref [5]
Extended Abstract: This paper has several objectives. First, it separates randomness from lawlessness and 
shows why even genuine randomness does not imply lawlessness. Second, it separates the question “why 
should I call a phenomenon random?” (and answers it in part one ) from the patent question “What is a 
random sequence?” for which the answer lies in Kolmogorov complexity ( which is explained in part two ). 
While answering the first question the note argues why there should be four motivating factors for calling a 
phenomenon  random:  ontic,  epistemic,  pseudo  and  telescopic,  the  first  two  depicting  “genuine” 
randomness and the last  two “false”. The author argues that the “why” part is meant for randomness in 
general while the “what” part is better suited for a random sequence. Ontic in the article means  what is  
actual  (irrespective of our knowledge). Epistemic is  what we know (hence it relates to our knowledge of  
something).  The literal  meaning of  pseudo is  false.  However  the author carefully splits  false into two 
categories: one is false that looks like genuine and only this is called pseudo in the article.  The other is 
false  that  looks  like false but  gives  us some potential  benefits  if  realized as genuine.  This other  false 
randomness  the  author  calls  telescopic  meaning  deliberately  realized. This  new  usage  of  the  word 
telescopic  (which  normally  means  farseeing)  needs  a  little  understanding  and  practice.  The  words 
deliberately and  realized are  both  important  to  understand  what  telescopic  means  in  such  an 
unconventional usage. Since telescopic randomness is a difficult concept, the author tries his best to explain 
it  with  technical  and  non-technical  arguments.  Third,  ontic  and  epistemic  randomness  have  been 
distinguished  from  ontic  and  epistemic  probability.  Fourth,  it  encourages  students  to  be  applied 
statisticians and advises against becoming armchair theorists but this is interestingly achieved by a straight 
application  of  telescopic  randomness.  Overall,  it  tells  (the  teacher)  not  to  jump to probability  without 
explaining  randomness  properly  first  and  similarly  advises  the  students  to  read  (and  understand) 
randomness minutely before taking on probability. 
Key words: {ontic, epistemic, pseudo, telescopic} randomness; Kolmogorov complexity
                                      PART ONE: Why should I call a phenomenon random?
Introduction: “Does randomness really mean lawlessness?” is a question I asked myself frequently and 
each time my conscience told me that because we  can’t create an effect without a cause (-Aristotle) there 
couldn’t be randomness if the word were used to imply lawlessness. But we do have randomness, don’t 
we? A careful thought explains that randomness does not quite mean lawlessness. All it means is that the 
experimental set up has an inherent variability which accounts for the unpredictability of the response and 
hence the “randomness” of the random experiment. Remember while defining a random experiment as an 
experiment in which the possible outcomes are known but which one will materialize cannot be predicted 
in advance even if the experiment is repeated under similar conditions, we merely said the conditions are 
“similar”.  Did  we  say  they  are  exhaustive?  Sure  enough  there  are  many  more  conditions  in  the 
experimental set up (that affect the response) that we did not take into account. And we did not for we have 
no control over them! Herein lies  the “inherent variability”.
                    A closer examination further reveals that there are two ways this “inherent variability” is 
caused: either the law (i.e. the exact model used by nature) is changing from realization to realization and 
thus we are unable to describe the system’s behaviour by a fixed law or the law is fixed but some or all of 
the  parameters  are  not.  The  first  is  precisely what  the  philosophers  call  ontic  indeterminism or  ontic  
randomness.  For  example,  consider  a  complex  biological  process  such  as  the  response  of  a  person 
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complaining of a certain set of symptoms to a certain treatment on different occasions. If the law were fixed 
on each occasion, medical science would be an easy profession! Again it does not mean that there is no 
law. In every realization there is a definite law that governs the cause-effect relationship. But the law holds 
for that realization only and changes in the next, the next and the next! Gentlemen, don’t you feel it is this 
dynamic nature of the law that we are misinterpreting as “lawlessness”?
               In contrast actual coin tossing, reflecting the second case, is a purely mechanical process and  
therefore can be described by Newton’s  laws of motion (see ref.  [1] and [7]),  and hence  it  cannot  be 
random “in principle” (that is not in the ontic sense) but is still random “in practice” (that is random in the 
epistemic sense) for we certainly  conceive it as random.* Here the inherent variability is caused by the 
parameters some of which are clearly dynamic (parameters include the exact force applied, the point at 
which it is applied, the wind velocity, the parameters involved in the bombardment of the air molecules 
with the molecules of the coin when the coin is spinning in the air etc.……can you fix all of them in every 
toss?). True, Persi Diaconis, the well known mathematician and former magician, could consistently obtain 
ten consecutive Heads in ten tosses of a coin by carefully controlling the initial velocity and the angular 
momentum (ref [1])  but the question of interest is: could he do this if the law were dynamic? Moreover it  
is not clear whether Diaconis could achieve it if the coin after falling over the ground  rolled.  Surely he 
must have tossed it over a rough surface (such as a magician’s table preferably with a cloth over it). I will 
not enter into this debate but it is clear that Diaconis was only attempting to fix the dynamic parameters. 
The law is already fixed whence it cannot be ontic indeterminism. We call it  epistemic indeterminism in 
that  it  is  not  the  system but  the  environmental  factors  contributing  to  the  inherent  variability  in  the  
experimental set up. By environmental factors, we mean to say that there is a complex and unknown law 
(or  even if  known we are unable to write  the exact  model equation and solve it  for  a  given set  of  
parameters advance knowledge of all of which we do not have) which generates a sequence where we 
find hard to recognize any pattern (and hence random!), the dynamic parameters and  our  inability to  
smother this dynamism. But since this law is fixed it is not “in principle” contributing to the randomness  
howsoever  complex it  may be.  It  would have created the same response if  only we could make the  
dynamic parameters static. It is to be understood that the inverent variability in the experimental set up 
is the causality and our ignorance/inabilitymentioned above a precipitating factor.
                    Classroom (ontic indeterminism versus epistemic indeterminism)
     Q:  What is common to ontic and epistemic indeterminism?
     A:  In both cases the law/laws are very complex and generate sequences where it is hard to find any 
pattern. In both cases we don’t know the exact law or are unable to write the model equation and solve it 
for a given set of parameters for a specific realization. 
     Q:   And what is the main difference?
     A:  I have already said it. In ontic indeterminism, the law is also dynamic! In epistemic case, the law is 
fixed (e. g. Newton’s laws of motion in a coin toss)
     Q:  You gave one example of ontic indetermisim from medical science (page 1).  Can you give another?
A. Here is another example: the movement of an individual gas molecule is random (in the ontic 
sense).
Q:  How do you explain it?
A: Suppose for the sake of argument, a gas molecule is at position A at one moment and goes to 
position B at the next and to position C at the very next. How did it come to B from A unless there is 
some explanation-rule? Definitely there is a law howsoever  complex  it  may  be.  The  point  of 
interest is: is the law that brought it from A to B the same as the law that brought it from B to C? If not, 
the indeterminism (which does not mean lawlessness) is clearly ontic. To the best of my knowledge, 
there is no fixed law that describes the movement of an individual gas  molecule.  Laws in Kinetic 
theory of gases are meant for a collection of gas molecules and not for an individual one!
Q:    Can  I  say  ontic  indeterminism  is  randomness  “in  principle”  and  epistemic  indeterminism  is 
randomness “in practice but not in principle”? 
A:  Well, you can, but you have to explain that “in principle” focuses on the system’s contribution and “in 
practice” refers to merely the environmental factors.
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Q: Please differentiate between causality and precipitating factors more simply.
A: Let me give you  a simpler example. Suppose you have a very bad cough and by mistake you happen to 
eat something that contained banana. If  now you get a terrible bout of coughing, will you say it is the 
banana that caused it? I would say: You already have an upper respiratory tract infection (causality) that 
might have been be precipitated by the banana. This sounds like a better explanation. It is assumed here 
that you are not allergic to banana and the fruit creates no problems  under normal conditions.
 
      
UPSHOT: Genuine randomness must be caused by an inherent variability in the experimental set up in 
addition to complexity of the  laws (causality),  precipitated by our ignorance of the exact  law and its  
parameters  in  specific  realizations  and  our  inability  to  smother  the  inherent  variability.  Since  our  
ignorance and inability to smother this inherent variability in the experimental set up is  playing a passive  
though definite  role,  it is wrong to call a phenomenon “random” out of sheer ignorance. 
*Remarks:-
1. Ontology refers to the (study of) properties of a system  as they are. Epistemology refers to the 
(study of) properties of  a system as we conceive.  Ontic and epistemic properties of a system can 
differ due to our knowledge of the system being insufficient. We would like to make it clear that 
we are explaining ontic and epistemic randomness and not ontic and epistemic probability. 
The aim of this article is to teach the why of randomness and not probability. However, the 
interested reader may refer to Hacking [11] who is often credited for coining the term “epistemic 
probability” meaning probability that has something to do with knowledge or information.  Ontic 
probability finds a mention in philosophical articles and refers to the relative frequency definition 
of probability. Hanna [12] discusses ontic probability. 
2. We would also like to clarify here that the “why” part concerns randomness in general and 
not random sequences.  Thus the words “law” simply means the exact  rule  that  explains the 
cause-effect relationship explicitly for the phenomenon.  The reason is that words such as “law” 
and “parameter”, which we are using in the “why” part, have different meanings when used in 
probability  and  with  respect  to  random  sequences.  For  example,  in  the  context  of  random 
sequences, a fixed “law”, e. g. a Poisson process with a fixed parameter, intensity λ, will produce 
a random sequence of outcomes. This probability model seems to contradict our views in that 
there is “inherent variability” without the “law” or the parameters changing! Hence a distinction 
between using the word “law” as applied to randomness in general as opposed to it being used for 
a random sequence must be made. If one extends the “why” part to a random sequence, “law” will 
be used to mean the exact law nature is using (static or dynamic) and “model” for the probabilistic 
or other approximation to this exact model the investigator is using. Thus in the coin toss, the law 
is Newton’s law of motion and the model for a single toss is Bernoullian. 
From the discussion above it follows that “genuine randomness” can be either ontic or epistemic.  In fact, 
even when the law is dynamic, one can conceptually think of a “Master Law” (of which the changing laws 
are subsets) that must surely be with God but the question is: are we using the word “random” from a 
heavenly domain or an earthly one? The moment we use the word “unpredictability” we must clarify that 
“unpredictability” is unpredictable purely from a human domain. Agreed that the philosophical aspects of 
randomness are much older than the science of probability historically, but is that not a flimsy excuse the 
statisticians continue to provide (for escaping a philosophical discussion on randomness), given that it is 
they who make the maximum noise about “noise”? I write this despite being a statistician myself with all 
my love and respect for the community notwithstanding. If the reader is also a statistician I bring to his 
kind attention the sharp criticism Professor Donald Knuth (Stanford University) has made (p. 149 of ref. 
[5]) over this very issue.  Professor Knuth  has  pointed out  that a statement such as “the numbers behave 
as if they are truly random may be satisfactory for practical purposes but it sidesteps a very important 
philosophical and theoretical question: Precisely what do we mean by “random behavior?” A quantitative 
definition is needed. It  is undesirable to talk about concepts that we do not really understand, especially 
since many apparently paradoxical statements can be made about random numbers.”
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Knuth  continues  with  his  characteristic  style…  “The  mathematical  theory  of  probability  and  statistics 
scrupulously  avoids  this  issue.  It  refrains  from  making  absolute  statements,  and  instead  expresses 
everything in terms of how much probability is to be attached to statements involving random sequences of 
events. The axioms of probability theory are set up so that abstract probabilities can be computed readily 
but nothing is said about what probability really signifies, or how this concept can be applied meaningfully 
to the actual world. In the book Probability, Statistics, and Truth (New York: Macmillan, 1957), R. von 
Mises  discusses  this  situation  in  detail,  and  presents  the  view that  a proper  definition  of  probability  
depends on obtaining a proper definition of a random sequence.” (see also the author’s final remark at the 
end of this article)
         Having covered “genuine randomness” I now come to that randomness which is “false”. Interestingly, 
even false randomness can be of two types. The first is the type that is false but looks like genuine. That is 
to say, we have a deterministic known model working in every trial but the model is so developed that the 
sequence of the response has some statistical properties of randomness similar to that which we expect in 
an ontic or epistemic case (like the number of “runs” being neither too small nor too large) where the model 
may not be in our  hand.  This is  the pseudo random case  (pseudo means false)  which is  at  best  only 
statistically random; two well known examples which I demonstrated in the (post-graduate) class include 
the (pseudo) random numbers generated by the computer  by Lehmer’s linear congruential method and by 
Tausworthe’s shift register method. See ref. [4] for details.
 
Classroom Exercises: For the linear congruential  model ri+1 = (ari + b) mod m (where m>0, 0<=a<m, 
0<=b<m, 0<= r0 <m) I gave students exercises to verify, by selecting numerical values of a, b and m, that 
(i) within a “cycle”  the sequence  does look like random and  therefore these can be used to  
simulate ontic  or epistemic randomness  provided only the entire simulation work is  over  
within the cycle [herein lies another philosophy: it makes sense to create randomness with a 
known model than an unknown one (-see Knuth)] and therefore that we must vow not to 
waste random numbers. Once a cycle is complete, the same sequence follows. 
(ii) an arbitrarily selected seed r0 may not give random numbers. I advised the students to allow 
the computer itself to select the seed as a detailed discussion on this might destroy interest. 
(iii) The constants a (called a priori) and b (called multiplier) must be selected to maximize the 
“period” which at most can be m (called modulus which is some large positive integer) as it 
comes from the remainders 0, 1, 2…m-1 in a desirable statistically random order (which are 
then divided by m to give an approximate U[0, 1] distribution).
 The students completed the exercises with little difficulty. For example it was nice to see one of them 
observing that a=b=1 always maximized the period but the sequence is never random! I pointed out a 
theorem (suppressing the proof) which asks b to be relatively prime to m, a-1 to be a multiple of p for 
any prime factor p of m and  a-1 to be a multiple of 4 if m is a multiple of 4 (for proof, see Knuth  [5])
One student enquired whether  it  is possible to have sequence where there is no cycle.  I  said it  is 
certainly possible pointing out that the digits in the decimal expansion of irrational numbers have this 
property. I further told him that pi has already been proposed as a random number generator and the 
allegation that it is “less random than we thought” has been nullified by George Marsaglia (see [14] 
and the reference cited therein).
Remark:  The  (pseudo)  random  generator  defined  here  is  called  multiplicative  if  b=0  and  mixed 
otherwise.
               The fourth and last category of randomness is the second category of false randomness which is 
neither random nor does it look like it is random. However if it is realized as random we get some potential 
benefits such as the prediction becoming less costly and more efficient. There are situations in which we do 
look for a cheaper and more efficient predictor e.g. in a computer experiment, which is a series of runs of a 
code for various inputs. I permit myself to call this last category  deliberately realized indeterminism  or 
telescopic indeterminism. Just as a telescope reduces the cost (physical effort, time, money etc.) of actually 
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reaching a distant  object  and  we agree to realize that  it  is  coming near (though it  is  not!) by looking 
through  the  telescope,  similarly  by  deliberately  realizing  the  non-random  data  as  the  outcome  of  a  
stochastic process we can reduce the cost of prediction and make prediction more efficient in a computer  
experiment. (ref[2]).  It is important to note that the experimental side of algorithmic complexity is 
only a special kind of a computer experiment in which the response variable is a complexity (some 
resource consumed, while executing the code, such as time).  While deterministic prediction requires 
knowledge of the entire input, for a stochastic prediction it suffices to know the size of the input which 
amounts to knowing some input parameter(s) that characterizes the size. This ability of the statistician to 
predict with partial knowledge of the input explains efficient prediction (especially in complexity analysis 
of  algorithms  where  algorithmic  complexity  itself  is  expressed  only as  a  function  of  input  parameter 
characterizing the input size). Cheap prediction here simply means the ability of the statistician to predict 
the response for huge untried inputs/input size for which it is computationally cumbersome to both feed the 
code and run it for such inputs. Designing a computer experiment amounts to efficient choice of input sites. 
For more on the link between algorithmic complexity and computer experiments, see ref [3].
Distinguishing telescopic randomness from non-telescopic randomness through classroom exercises:- 
Fortunately several  of the exercises I gave in the class on this intriguing topic are already available in 
published papers. 
                                          Classroom
 I asked one group of postgraduate students to write programs on Replacement sort and another group on 
Winograd's algorithm on n x n matrix multiplication respectively and measure the number of interchanges 
for the first and running times for the second at different points of n, for randomly varying input elements 
taking several readings at each point of n. They were asked to report their observations to me. They gave 
me the following reports :-
First Group (who programmed Replacement sort in C and BASIC): It is easy to generate a good quality of 
"noise" at each point of n. It makes sense to characterize the response by a stochastic model as a function of  
n.
I explained: Yes, and this is because in a sorting algorithm fixing n does not fix  the computing operations 
which also depend on the input elements and their relative positions. Hence the deterministic response 
which  comes  for  a  fixed input  may be  taken  as  stochastic  for  a  fixed n and  randomly varying  input 
elements. The argument is definitely true for algorithms such as sorting and searching. I pointed out to the 
students that this is the argument Professor Hosam Mahmoud (George Washington University) has given in 
the preface of his book in ref. [9]. In ref. [3] I have called it the traditional school of thought (for defending 
stochastic modeling). In this case fixing n fixed the comparisons = n(n-1)/2 since the simplified version of 
replacement sort [3] was used but the interchanges were certainly not fixed. They generated the desired 
“noise” for each n.
Second Group (who programmed Winograd's  algorithm):  Even for  higher  n  (which means more input 
elements)  it is hard to generate "noise" for repeated trials at each n. Most readings are identical and even 
for those which are not, the negligible difference makes it difficult to ascertain as to whether it is caused by 
the idiosyncrasies of computer clocks or a genuine random behavior of the time response. The students 
enquired whether a stochastic model can be fitted here also and, if yes, on what ground?
I explained:  In  Winograd's  algorithm on nxn matrix multiplication, fixing n   fixes  all the computing  
operations. That is why it hard to generate "noise" at each point of n simply by manipulating the operands 
(the matrix elements).The time consumed by an operation depends on three factors: the operation type, the 
system and the operands. But only the first two are major contributors. I am not saying the operands do not 
contribute to time. They do. For example, operands consuming fewer bytes will require less time for their 
storage in the memory. But such contributions are not enough to create "noise" in the sense of randomness 
or  at  least  statistical  randomness!  Regarding  fitting  a  stochastic  model,  you  can  certainly  fit  but  the 
argument for defending it has to be different from that in the sorting algorithm case. All you need to say is 
that as your experiment is a computer experiment so you are only looking for a cheaper predictor…
cheaper and efficient...and proceed. I pointed out to the students that this is the same argument Professor 
Jerome Sacks (now a Professor Emeritus at Duke University; formerly Professor and Head, Department of 
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Statistics,  University  of  Illinois)  gave  in  a  landmark  paper  [2]  which  prominent  statisticians  such  as 
Michael  Stein  “wholeheartedly”  supported  criticizing  traditional  statisticians,  accustomed  to  fitting 
stochastic  models only to  random data,  for  shying away from untraditional  research  (fitting stochastic 
models to non-random data). (I too seriously used the word “untraditional” in [3] and no pun is intended)
UPSHOT: The randomness in the second case is telescopic since it is neither random nor does it look like. 
In the first it is at least statistically random We want a model with n only as predictor and expect some 
statistical  properties  of  randomness  from  such  a  model  and  make  use  of  them.  If  we  wanted  exact 
prediction, which corresponds to a specific input, a deterministic model is to be sought. 
Q: What is the main difference between pseudo and telescopic randomness?
A: The difference between telescopic randomness and pseudo randomness is that while both are false, 
pseudo  randomness  at  least  looks  random  and  therefore  it  can  be  used  to  simulate  genuine 
randomness. Telescopic randomness does not even look random! Imagine a phenomenon generating 
observations as say ….…40, 40, 40, 40, 40……where it is understood that all repetitions on the left and 
right are 40 as well. While an armchair theorist would say “Sure Statistics, which is a study of variation 
pertaining to numerical  data,  has nothing to do such phenomenon. Where is the variation?” an applied 
statistician (such as Sacks and Stein) has other ideas. Most computer experiments are deterministic and this 
is true regardless of whether the response is the output or a complexity. Then why are they characterized by 
stochastic models? I have already answered this question earlier and would simply now refer to [2] and [3] 
for more on it. 
BENEFITS:  The first paper in any peer  reviewed journal which connects  algorithmic complexity  with  
computer experiments has two of my post graduate students partnering me (see ref. [3]). The first such 
paper  in  any journal  is  possibly the  popular  science  article  [10]  where  again  my young  friends  have 
partnered me. Winograd’s algorithm results are also published [8]. I encouraged the students to seek other 
situations where telescopic indeterminism might apply.
             
            As a final comment, this note answers the question: Why should I call a phenomenon random (even  
if it is not!)? Observe that this is different from the patent question: What is a random sequence and what is  
not? [5] The first question seeks the possible motivations for calling a phenomenon random (and I have 
argued there can be four). The second demands a strict qualification for a random sequence and seeks a 
mathematical tool for the purpose. For the latter question the straightforward answer is:  A sequence is 
random if  the length of  the shortest  program which outputs the sequence (technically  called the 
Kolmogorov complexity of the sequence) equals the length of the sequence. But this is an established 
concept  (thanks  to  Knuth  again  among others;  See  also  [6])  and  there  is  hardly  any  room for  fresh 
arguments except write a non-technical note on it which is easily grasped compared to Knuth’s “bible”! 
This is in fact what I promise to do in part two of this article. The present article is meant for statistics 
students  exclusively whereas  Kolmogorov  complexity  is  more  about  computing  science  and  applied 
mathematics than statistics and probability. I therefore sensibly concentrated on the “why?” part only here 
which relates to a phenomenon being classified as random (either in true or false sense) on the basis of 
motivating factor rather than a specific random sequence for which the “what” part is ideal. I shall however 
explain later why the “what” part is more meaningful for a random sequence than for general randomness.
                  I also attempted to teach telescopic randomness at the undergraduate level in a non-technical 
way citing other situations where we opt for realizations rather than reality like cinema, poetry and even 
war and linking them with statistics. For example, the students found it quite amusing when I said “Think 
of the actor Ben Kingsley realizing himself as Mahatma Gandhi in Richard Attenborough’s classic movie 
“Gandhi”,  think  of  Nepoleon  asking  his  soldiers  “Where  is  Alps?  I  don’t  see  any Alps!  Go ahead!”. 
Clearly there was  Alps blocking the soldiers. This is reality. What Nepoleon asked his soldiers to do is a 
realization.  Similarly  Ben Kingsley  is  clearly  not  the  Mahatma but  let  us  face  the  truth;  the original 
Mahatma is no more and the tale has to be told by a living man. And that is precisely what Kingsley did 
while acting under the jurisdiction of the director. The money a professional actor earns, the pleasure and 
personal satisfaction he derives from acting and the healthy entertainment he provides in return are the 
potential benefits. Think of the anonymous Hindi poet who breaks the rhythm to write “Tum mujhe kya 
kharidoge? Main muft hoon!” (translated free, it reads: In what way will you buy me?/ I am free!). I ask: do 
poems sell because of rhythm or do they sell because of ideas? If it is the ideas that are more important in 
6
the final analysis, why should a stochastic model depend exclusively on the randomness of the data? Why 
not on the statistician’s motivation (idea) which can be justified in contexts even where there is a total 
absence of randomness? (this link between poetry and stochastic modelling is available in [3])
      The periphery of reality is quite limited in that if there is water in the glass, there is water and if there is 
no water then there is no water. This is reality.  Imagination has a much wider periphery. Take an empty 
glass in summer, imagine there is water and pretend to drink it. Does it lift your spirits? I have tried this. It  
does! (if it does not, imagine wine in place of water!). The point is: statistics can be made and I define an 
applied statistician not as one who merely applies statistics in other areas (for which the nomenclature  
“statistical practitioner” suffices) but as one who wholeheartedly believes in making statistics even where  
there is none rather than wait for nature to provide a tailor-made situation for him.  Note 1: The words 
deliberately and  realized are  both  important  to  understand  what  telescopic  means  in  such  an 
unconventional usage. Since telescopic randomness is a difficult concept, I tried my best to explain it with 
technical  and  non-technical  arguments.  Nevertheless,  the  beginner  is  advised  to  use  the  nomenclature 
deliberately realized indeterminism initially and replace it by its synonym telescopic indeterminism only 
after gaining some confidence.
Note2:  Strictly speaking, cinema is both pseudo and telescopic. It is pseudo in that Kingsley dressed and 
behaved as Gandhi and therefore looked like the original Gandhi on screen. It is telescopic in that he had to 
realize himself as Gandhi and not Kinsley in order to behave like Gandhi to some perfection.  It is to be 
understood that the realization part is more important. You or I can dress like Gandhi, cut all the hair, wear 
spectacles, walk with a stick etc. But how many of us can act like Kingsley? 
Final  remark:  Most  teachers  and  authors  of  probability  books  begin  with  a  shallow  explanation  of 
randomness and jump to probability thinking it is possible to explain probability meaningfully even with a 
workable explanation of randomness. It is not. Probability can be meaningfully appreciated provided only 
randomness  is properly understood first.  Further,  a proper knowledge of randomness is never acquired 
without learning both the “why” and the “what” part.  The “why”  part  is a fairly general  question and 
therefore more suited for a phenomenon rather than a specific sequence in hand. But it is more challenging 
to ask the “what” part for a sequence rather than a phenomenon. For, if the question is “What is a random 
phenomenon in the true sense?” the simple answer would be “One which is random either in the ontic or 
the epistemic sense”.  Similarly to the question “What is  a random phenomenon in a false sense?” the 
simple  answer  is  “One which is  random either  in  a  pseudo or  a  telescopic  sense”.  But  for  a  random 
sequence the “what” part assumes a special significance and has to be dealt with separately because  the 
galaxy  of  statistical  tests  on  randomness  (gap  test,  poker  test,  run  test  to  name  only  a  few)  taken  
collectively fail to certify randomness of a sequence in the strict sense and merely certify that the sequence  
“looks like random”. Although it serves some purpose (e.g. simulating genuine randomness), as mentioned 
earlier,  such  ‘looking  like’  activities  are  disliked  by  celebrated  mathematicians  and  I  therefore  thank 
Professor Knuth among others [6] for painstakingly explaining the “what” part of a random sequence in ref. 
[5] while I took on the more general “why” part here to complete the “noisy” story. As mentioned earlier, 
the “what” part of a random sequence has more to do with computer science and mathematics rather than 
statistics as here the basic question “what has a computer program to do with a random sequence?” has 
to be addressed to the students. I shall now provide a non-technical note on it in part two. 
                           I end this part with two memorable quotes:
God does not play dice.
                     -----Albert Einstein (Creator and Rebel, 1973, p. 193)
God not only plays dice, He also sometimes throws the dice where they cannot be seen.
                    ----- Stephen W. Hawking (Nature, 1975, 257, p. 362)
 
And I leave it to the reader to resolve the contradiction between the two quotes and hence discover the 
contribution which I believe he should be able to do if he has understood this part. [Part one Concluded]
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                             PART TWO: What is a random sequence?
                            
It was stated (in part one) that a sequence is random in the strict sense if the length of the shortest program 
which outputs the sequence (called the Kolmogorov complexity of the sequence) equals the length of the 
sequence itself. Part two of this paper explains the meaning of this definition in a friendly tone. It answers 
the fundamental question “What has a computer program to do with a random sequence?”. To understand 
the definition we must clarify why we are interested in the shortest  program which outputs the sequence 
and not any arbitrary program and what role the length of the program plays in determining randomness.
Suppose a BASIC programmer writes
PRINT “AB”;
END
(this will run perfectly in QBASIC environment with AB as the output; statements need not be numbered in 
QBASIC) It looks he has written a small program. A moment’s reflection however suggests that the length 
of the program is somewhat greater than the length of the sequence for the entire sequence has been written 
inside  the  program!  And  what  if  the  sequence  had  1000  characters?  Would  he  write  PRINT 
“ABABAB….AB”( each letter repeated 500 times)?
Using intelligent programming we could certainly do better as follows:
FOR i=1 TO 500
PRINT “AB”;
NEXT i
END
Only 31 characters are used in the code above to output the desired sequence!
If  the sequence ABAB…had  10000 characters we would simply replace 500 in the code by 5000. In 
general, to generate AB… n times, n itself will have to be specified by some positive integer. If w is the 
largest positive integer such that 10w ≤ n, i.e., w  ≤ log  10  n then log  10  n is the approximate number of 
characters required to specify n which means the length of the code above in the general case is roughly 28 
+ log 10 n  which for large n is small in comparison to n.
                                                     Classroom
Student:  It  seems we cannot  create  a  program, which outputs a  sequence,  shorter  than the number  of 
characters needed to specify the sequence.
Teacher: Correct. In the example above we only tried to get close to that figure. We could easily write 
longer  codes  which would output the same sequence,  e.g.,  using some empty FOR…NEXT loops and 
therefore  it  makes  sense  to  consider  the  shortest  programs  only  and  not  all  programs  for  explaining 
randomness. I hope you have understood this.
Student: Indeed I have but there is another important lesson I have learnt from this example. Because the 
sequence ABAB… had a definite pattern so we could write a short program to generate it a large number of 
times using a programming strategy (counter controlled looping technique). It seems logical to argue that a 
sequence with no pattern would require a larger program for its generation than a sequence with patterns. 
This  explains  why  the  length  of  the  program  is  taken  into  consideration  (rather  than  the  underlying 
algorithm’s complexity such as time or space) for defining randomness. But is there a sequence which 
cannot be generated by any program (howsoever it is written) except that whose length is approximately 
the length of the sequence itself? That would be a “truly random” sequence! 
Teacher: Yes, there can be such a sequence. But before we prove the existence of such a sequence, we have 
to  first  clarify  what  programming language  is  being used.  BASIC  programs  are  shorter  than  those  in 
COBOL or FORTRAN generally. Again, celebrated computer scientists such as Professor Donald Knuth 
(Stanford university) prefer to work on machine language only (0 and 1). Since all programs, whatever be 
the programming language used, are ultimately converted to 0 and 1 only, therefore there is no harm in 
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confining ourselves to machine code only.  Further we make a rule that no program can be a prefix of 
another e.g., both 101 and 101110 cannot be valid as 101 is a prefix in 101110. 
            
               Now let us consider all possible sequences of 0’s and 1’s of fixed length n. There can be 2 n such 
sequences. Since each program can output only one sequence and no program can be a prefix of another, 
there are at most 2r sequences of length r whence the number of programs of length less than n is at most  20 
+ 21 + 22 + …. + 2n-1 = 2n – 1.
As each program is outputting only one sequence, as mentioned earlier, from the above we conclude that 
there is at least one sequence of length n which is not outputted by the programs of length less than n, that 
is to say, which will require a program of length n or higher. This completes the proof.
Remark: As ½ x 2n = 2n-1   and   20 + 21 + 22 + …. + 2n-2 = 2n-1 – 1 it follows that half the sequences of length n 
will require programs of length n-1 or higher for their generation. 
This means quite a good number of sequences are almost random!
                                                           Classroom
Student: I have understood now what a computer program has to do with a sequence being random and that 
there are random sequences. But can you give me an example of a random sequence? It has to be “random” 
in the sense of Kolmogorov complexity.
Teacher:  In  fact  this  discussion  will  be  incomplete  without  such  an  illustration.  The  desired  random 
sequence will be an infinite sequence of 0’s and 1’s in the programming language that we agreed upon 
where no program can be a prefix of another. To generate the first n bits of this sequence, we will require a 
program of length greater than n-k. We shall see what value k takes. You will find it to be like the constant 
28 in the BASIC code discussed earlier.
Let us group the programs into two: those that halt (after generating a sequence) and those that do not, i.e. 
they enter  some infinite loop. Next consider  the totality of all  programs from both the groups.  Let  us 
inspect each program and if it halts, compute 1/2u
where u is the program’s length. Our desired sequence is the binary equivalent of the sum* of all such 
terms of the form 1/2u after deleting the (binary) point. 
(*this sum is a number between 0 and 1 by Kraft’s inequality. We omit the proof.)
Student: But how do we verify that this is the desired random sequence?
Teacher: Let us call this sequence N. To verify that N is indeed random, we have to utilize the fact that the 
N contains information as to which programs halt and which do not. Observe that N is the sum of terms of 
the form x/2y where x is the number of programs of length y that halt. Since no program can be a prefix of 
another it means that the numbers for the different lengths do not get jumbled up in constituting N and each 
can be successfully extracted!
              Now suppose there is a program P which generates the first n bits of N. Further let Q be a program 
which has P as a subroutine and the main routine has k characters. N may be taken as a random sequence if 
we can show that the length of P must be greater than n-k.
Student: That sounds interesting. But how will you prove it?
Teacher: The main routine first calls P and gets the first n bits of N. Using the information contained in the 
first n bits of N, the main routine figures out how many programs (of length at most n) halt. Suppose this 
number is T. It is also able to figure out how many programs (of length at most n) do not halt.  This is done 
by picking up each program and executing it until it halts with a counter being kept that keeps increasing by 
one each time a halting program is discovered.  The final  value of the counter reads T. Next, for each 
program that halts, the main routine determines the sequence outputted by this program. Finally the main 
routine determines a  sequence which is different from all the sequences outputted by halting programs of 
length at most n. This sequence must have Kolmogorov complexity more than n in that it is not generated 
by any of the programs of length at most n that halt. Evidently, we have length of Q = length of P + k. 
Since the final output of Q is a sequence with Kolmogorov complexity more than n, the length of Q must 
be more than n = n + f (say) whence n + f = length of P + k which means length of P = n-k + f > n-k.  
Q. E. D.!
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Student: I have understood the proof alright but I still have some queries. First, suppose the main routine 
picks up a program that does not halt by mistake. It will get stuck!
Teacher: Yes, it will! To prevent this, the main routine will first execute each program for one step. Then 
each program which has not yet halted is run for two steps. Then each unhalted program is similarly run for 
three steps and so on. The process continues until T programs have halted. The main routine now knows 
which programs have halted and hence the remaining must be those that do not halt. [13]
Remark: There is a famous halting problem (proved by Turing) which states that there is no program 
which can check whether another program halts. If such a program existed, our task would be a cake 
walk. We could easily have a short program P to compute the first n bits of N, for each n, by first 
counting all programs of length n or less, then deciding for each such program as to whether it halts or 
not and sum terms of the form 1/2u  to N for each program of length u that halts.  Observe how our 
inability to do so has been combated in the discussion above. [Concluded]
Acknowlegement: This article is dedicated to the untraditional revolutionist Prof. Jerome Sacks and the 
inimitable  Prof.  Donald  Knuth. I  thank  Prof.  William  Notz  and  an  anonymous  referee  for  several 
suggestions. I thank all the authors wholeheartedly whose works I have freely consulted.
References:-
1. S. Bolchan, What is a random sequence?, Ame. Math. Monthly, Jan, 2002
2. J. Sacks, W. Welch, T. Mitchell, H. Wynn,  Design and Analysis of Computer Experiments, Stat. Sc., 4(4), 
1989
3. S. Chakraborty,  S. K. Sourabh, M. Bose, K. Sushant,  Replacement sort  revisited: The “gold standard” 
unearthed!, Appl. Math. And Compu. Vol. 189, issue 1, 2007, p. 384-394 
4. W. Kennedy, J. Gentle, Statistical Computing, Marcel Dekker Inc. 1980
5. D. E. Knuth,  The Art of Computer Programming, Vol. 2: Seminumerical Algorithms, Pearson Edu., Third 
Indian Reprint, 2000
6. M. Li, P. M. B. Vitanyi, An Introduction to Kolmogorov Complexity and Its Applications, Springer, 1993
7. J. Ford, How random is a coin toss?, Physics Today, Vol. 36, 1983, p. 40-47
8. S. Chakraborty and K. K. Sundararajan, Winograd’s algorithm statistically revisited: It pays to weigh than to  
count!,  Appl. Math. And Compu , 190(1), 2007, p. 15-20 (see also InterStat March2006#5 for D-optimality 
results; on this algorithm; http://interstat.statjournals.net/)
9. H. Mahmoud, Sorting: a Distribution Theory, John Wiley, 2000 
10. S. Chakraborty, K. K. Sundararajan, B. K. Das, S. K. Sourabh,  On How Statistics Provides a Reliable and  
valid Measure for an Algorithm’s Complexity, InterStat Dec2004#2, http://interstat.statjournals.net/
11. I. Hacking, Emergence of Probability, Cambridge University Press, 1975
12. J. Hanna, Probabilistic Explanation and Probabilistic Causality, Proceedings of the 1982 Biennial Meeting 
of the Philosophy of Science Association (PSA 1982), 2, 181-193.
13. G. J. Chaitin, Algorithmic Information Theory, Cambridge University Press, 1990.
14. S. Chakraborty, Review of the research paper titled Common Defects in Initialization of  Pseudorandom 
Number Generators by Matsumoto, Wada, Kuramoto and Ashihara, ACM Transactions   on  modeling 
and Computer Simulation, 17(4), article 15, Sept 2007 published in Computing  Reviews,  Dec  23,  2007 
[recommended as a  “best review” by the editor] 
10
